WHY REWARDS ARE BETTER THAN SANCTIONS.
In: Economics & Politics, Jg. 23 (2011-07-01), Heft 2, S. 220-238
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Zugriff:
Sanctions are said to fail because of the 'rally-round-the-flag effect'. This is the main reason why many advocate the use of positive incentives as a viable alternative. Not only do rewards provoke no defensive reaction, but they may elicit a rally in support of compliance - a 'fifth-column effect.' Yet, positive incentives are vulnerable to extortion - doing wrong in the hope of obtaining larger rewards. As a result, many conjecture that sanction threats and promises of reward are most efficient when used simultaneously. We put this conjecture to a test, staging a formal confrontation of the two forms of incentives. Our model pits a sanctioner and a target in a game allowing for the possibility of rally-round-the-flag, fifth-column, and extortion effects. The game yields unambiguous results: under no circumstances should a sanctioner prefer sanction threats to reward promises. This result holds despite the risk of extortion, a risk that proves to be less of a drawback than the rally round the flag. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Titel: |
WHY REWARDS ARE BETTER THAN SANCTIONS.
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | VERDIER, DANIEL ; WOO, BYUNGWON |
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Zeitschrift: | Economics & Politics, Jg. 23 (2011-07-01), Heft 2, S. 220-238 |
Veröffentlichung: | 2011 |
Medientyp: | academicJournal |
ISSN: | 0954-1985 (print) |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2010.00380.x |
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